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~~(S)~~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

October 18, 1968

CEH
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX

SUBJECT: BYEMAN Clearances and Data for DIA's EMPAC System

Problem:

To inform you of (1) DIA's Executive Management Planning and Control System (EMPAC) and (2) of my recommendation that we furnish no BYEMAN access or data for use in connection with this system.

Background:

On July 2, I met with Admiral Lowrance, DIA, to hear a briefing on EMPAC. This system was developed by Lockheed (Sunnyvale) on a contract with DIA. The development was based on a request from General Carroll who requested, on April 21, 1965, an in-house study "on the general subject of the adequacy, qualitatively and quantitatively, of the analytical resources available to exploit the increasing volume of intelligence information being collected."

The Lockheed response goes far beyond General Carroll's request. It has these characteristics:

1. It proposes to define informational end-objectives. These are synthesized from a complicated "Factor Matrix" which examines "attributes, parameters, intelligence end-objectives, military missions, military strategies, defense policies and doctrine, objectives of military strategy, and national security policy.
2. It proposes to develop tentative operating plans for each end-objective. These plans describe the combinations of operational capabilities which could provide the data necessary to satisfy informational end-objectives.

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3. It proposes to evaluate these plans by cost-effectiveness criteria and select one. Having made the selection, DIA would "pass the selected plan to operations for implementation."

4. It proposes to monitor the execution of the plan.

At the end of the briefing, I asked about Items 2, 3, and 4, pointing out that they sounded like NRO functions. I was assured that all work, for a long time, would go into Item 1 -- the development of end-objectives -- and that Item 1 was the only area where DIA needed NRO assistance, at the present time, in obtaining BYEMAN access (clearances) and data. I expressed my inability to see how BYEMAN data would serve the purposes of Item 1. After discussion, I told Admiral Lowrance (who, by the way, has been made Project Officer on EMPAC) that Colonel Sweeney would work with his people and that TKH materials, already available to DIA, should meet all their (proper) needs. I also stated that if BYEMAN access or data were ever required, we would need to have basic policy discussions on the roles of DIA and NRO. Admiral Lowrance agreed to my statements.

Present Situation:

The letters at Tab A show clearly a desire on the part of DIA to "go BYEMAN" on EMPAC. In line with my discussions with Admiral Lowrance (above) and you (recently), I am advising Lowrance that the basic policy discussions I referenced are now in order (see Tab B).

Recommendation:

While I hope that this reminder prompts Admiral Lowrance to re-evaluate his "need" for BYEMAN clearances and data, our previous DIA experiences indicate that he will probably take up this matter with you. I recommend that the requests be firmly denied on the ground that DIA is attempting to create an impossible admixture of requirements and operations.



RUSSELL A. BERG
Brigadier General, USAF

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